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Turnout, information and heuristics in the Scottish Health Board elections: “Getting a CV 
with no job description” 
 
British public services have traditionally been overseen by appointees. The idea that many of 
these posts should be filled by direct election, as a means of increasing engagement with 
local communities and accountability to them, appears to be gaining traction. In Health 
Board Election pilots in 2010 the Scottish Government replaced appointees to regional 
Health Boards (serving six-figure populations) with popularly-elected members. The 
Government attempted to maintain the insulation of Health Boards from party politics by 
restricting the use of partisan labels. Voters were deprived of a heuristic which usually helps 
them to decide how to cast their votes. Many electors did not vote, while others sought 
alternative heuristics. Interviewees simultaneously decried partisan politics, lack of 
information, and low turnout by the rest of the population. These dislikes seem to conflict 
with each other. Moreover, the experience shows how the heuristics available to voters can 
shape democratic governance. 
 
Should the public directly elect public officials? The principle that the highest-level decision-
makers should be elected has become totemic in Britain. Yet in practice many administrative 
decisions are made by appointees (Skelcher 1998, Wilks 2007). If democracy equals 
elections, it is tempting to assume more elections equals more democracy and electing 
officials at lower levels of governance will lead to more of the kinds of virtues we usually 
associate with democratic systems (Greer et al 2014). British governments have been 
experimenting with direct elections for various lower-level positions, such as mayors and 
police commissioners (Sampson 2012), with the declared aim of enhancing local 
accountability. At the same time, turnout remains a concern. Elections can only democratize 
if electors are able and willing to choose between competing alternatives. But as elections 
proliferate, voters will need more and more information to make informed decisions. This 
paper is not so much concerned with who voters choose as with how difficulty distinguishing 
among candidates affects participation. 
    Voters rarely possess detailed biographies of the candidates. Instead, they use a range of 
heuristic devices to guess at salient facts about the contenders (Johns and Shephard 2011: 
637-9).  
    In conventional elections party labels are the key heuristic which helps many voters decide 
even when they know little about candidates (or even the office). There are many areas of the 
‘Turnout,	  information	  and	  heuristics	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Health	  Board	  elections:	  “getting	  a	  CV	  with	  no	  job	  
description”’	  
Draft	  version	  of	  an	  article	  forthcoming	  in	  Political	  Studies,	  2014.	  	  
Authors:	  Iain	  Wilson,	  Scott	  L.	  Greer,	  Ellen	  Stewart	  and	  Peter	  D.	  Donnelly.	  
	  
2	  
	  
public sector where voters oppose ‘politicisation’, particularly partisan conflict. As we will 
see, the National Health Service is one of the most sensitive (see also BBC 2007). As a result, 
pilot elections to two Scottish Health Boards were made nonpartisan. Our research suggests 
that this generates inherent tensions. 
    We present a case study of these elections. While nonpartisan elections do occur in the 
UK, they usually involve small communities where voters are likely to know most candidates 
personally; these elections were outliers because the Health Boards serve 6-figure 
populations. The high cost of information depressed turnout, while voters who did participate 
relied heavily on alternative heuristics. Restricting a popular shortcut had perverse 
consequences. 
   We first set out the context of the elections, and explain why gathering enough information 
to decide between candidates became troublesome for electors. Political parties were 
restrained from trying to affect their decisions due to a taboo against partisan politics in the 
NHS. We note that the existing literature indicates that parties usually play an important 
heuristic role, helping voters to decide without costly research. When deprived of 
conventional heuristic devices, electors should be more likely to abstain or seek alternatives. 
Our empirical evidence shows exactly that. Which heuristics are made available to voters 
affects outcomes at least at the margin, and this necessarily shapes democratic governance. 
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Context 
Since devolution, the NHS in Scotland has been controlled by the Scottish Government. The 
Health Service is administered largely by 14 territorial Health Boards1, each responsible for 
NHS operations in specified geographic regions. These Boards have historically been 
composed of Executive Directors, who are senior NHS employees, and Non-Executive 
Directors who are either representatives of key interest groups or Scottish Government 
appointees (Greer 2008). Government appointees are the largest group.  
    The Scottish National Party formed its first government in Scotland in 2007. Before the 
election, the SNP had committed to hold elections for regional Health Boards, replacing 
Scottish Government appointees with popularly-elected citizens. The SNP lacked an overall 
majority, and Ministers were unable to gain the support they would have needed to institute 
elections across Scotland. Instead, they secured support for pilot elections in two Health 
Boards, Fife and Dumfries & Galloway, in June 2010. The pilots were to be evaluated before 
any decision was taken on a national roll-out of elections.  
    We were commissioned to conduct the statutory evaluation, which granted us unparalleled 
access to electors. We  
• analysed official voting records for the whole electorate 
• surveyed a sample of local electors, selecting 3000 residents of Fife and 3000 
residents of Dumfries & Galloway at random from the electoral register  
• interviewed 10 electors in each area to find out about the mental process they went 
through in deciding whether and how they would vote 
    Each of these sought slightly different information. The in-depth interviews and surveys 
gave us an insight into why electors did or did not vote. Only interviews informed us about 
how electors decided between the candidates. Our survey included closed-form questions 
about how much information respondents felt they had about the election, and also an open-
text box asking them to write in an explanation of why they voted or (more commonly) did 
not vote. We discuss the details under ‘electors’ reactions’. 
    Our most striking finding was that turnout in the elections was dramatically lower than in 
national or local council elections. 22.6% of ballots were returned in Dumfries & Galloway, 
where a controversial hospital-closure plan had been proposed, and 13.9% in Fife. The Health 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  There	  are	  ‘Special’	  Health	  Boards	  which	  provide	  some	  Scotland-­‐wide	  services	  such	  as	  blood	  transfusions	  and	  
specialised	  education,	  but	  elections	  have	  only	  been	  proposed	  for	  territorial	  Boards.	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Board elections closely followed the 2010 UK General Election, a well-publicised and highly 
partisan contest. This may well have contributed to voter fatigue, depressing turnout.  
    This disappointing turnout occurred despite efforts to make voting as accessible as 
possible. The Health Board elections were all-postal, with ballot papers and explanatory notes 
sent to over half-a-million eligible electors in the two pilot areas. By contrast, in the General 
Election everyone was asked to travel to a polling station, with postal votes only for those 
who specifically requested one. We did hear some anecdotal evidence of electors simply 
discarding Health Board voting packs without reading them, but it seems unlikely that the 
postal ballot depressed turnout. While the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, all-postal 
voting has generally been associated with somewhat higher turnout than conventional ballots 
(see e.g. Electoral Commission 2005, Karp and Banducci 2000, Leuchinger, Rosinger and 
Stutzer 2007, cf. Kousser and Mullin 2007). Karp and Banducci (2000) argue that this benefit 
is particularly apparent in “low-stimulus” elections dealing with local issues which receive 
less media attention, a description which seems to fit the Health Board contests very well, 
while Kousser and Mullin (2007) suggest that there may only be benefits in these kinds of 
elections2. Both are sceptical that postal voting will appeal to alienated groups, but expect 
that it will encourage people who typically vote but do not consider a particular election 
important enough to bother travelling to a polling station. This suggests the all-postal ballot 
would have increased turnout, at least among the kinds of electors who tend to turn out 
normally. 
    On the other hand, there are good reasons to think most electors would have needed to 
spend a lot of time informing themselves about the elections. This made them critical tests of 
how electors respond to elections in which voters find gathering information about their 
choice very expensive. 
Costs of information in these elections 
Most voters are not familiar with the role of Health Boards, particularly their non-executive 
members, in the wider NHS system. While Health Boards do make important decisions, they 
are not high-profile bodies – and most fundamental policy changes are ultimately made by 
the Scottish Government (Greer 2008). From our interviews with voters and candidates it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Patricia	  Funk’s	  (2008)	  findings	  challenge	  this	  idea,	  showing	  that	  when	  postal	  voting	  was	  introduced	  in	  
Switzerland	  turnout	  actually	  fell	  in	  some	  areas.	  She	  interprets	  this	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  non-­‐voters	  no	  longer	  felt	  
stigmatised	  by	  not	  being	  seen	  to	  turn	  out.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  we	  should	  have	  expected	  analogous	  
effects	  in	  the	  Health	  Board	  elections,	  since	  Funk	  finds	  this	  effect	  in	  small,	  close-­‐knit	  communities	  and	  in	  
established	  elections	  with	  fixed	  polling	  places.	  The	  Health	  Board	  elections	  were	  distinguished	  by	  their	  novelty,	  
large	  electorates	  and	  voter	  privacy.	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clear that even well-informed citizens were not clear what kind of influence elected members 
would actually have.  
    The Health Board elections themselves were unlike conventional elections in several 
respects, even though the Health Board areas had six-figure electorates and few voters knew 
any given candidate personally.  
   Ordinarily, Scottish voters are presented with a list of candidates’ names and addresses and 
a prominent party symbol. If voters want more information about the people on the ballot 
they need to conduct independent research before they arrive at the polling station; once 
there, all they have to rely on is name, party and address (and major party candidates usually 
list a constituency office rather than their home address). Without advance research, or 
personal experience, voters rely on information presented with the ballot paper. This makes 
the party label a key heuristic. Hence, printing party labels on ballot papers for other elections 
increases parties’ salience – the Progressive rationale for holding non-partisan elections in the 
United States (Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001). 
    For the Health Board elections, seventy people stood as candidates in Dumfries & 
Galloway and sixty in Fife. This reflected trivial barriers to becoming a candidate. With very 
few exceptions, anyone who lived in the area could stand if they could persuade one other 
person to support them. Candidates were not asked for any monetary deposit, although they 
were restricted to spending a maximum of £250 of their own money on campaigning3. 
Electoral rules also diminished the crucial informal barrier to entry in most elections: 
selection by a major political party. As in most mature democracies, candidates in British 
elections usually only have a realistic chance of being elected if they are endorsed by a major 
political party. Independents are elected, but only rarely. Successful independents typically 
have a high profile locally before they stand (Cowley and Stuart 2009). In the Health Board 
elections low-profile figures were forced to be ‘fully independent’ in Copus et al’s (2009) 
terminology.  
   Few candidates had party affiliations, but those who did could not have their party symbol 
printed on the ballot.    The Health Board elections were designed to restrict the role of 
political parties and increase independents’ odds of success (Scottish Government Interview 
One, Scottish National Party Interview One). Instead, voters were faced with a ballot paper 
which listed only names in alphabetical order and addresses. The ballot paper was 
accompanied by a booklet in which each candidate was allocated around 18 square inches 
and 250 words in which to make his or her case. These booklets ran to well over 10000 words 
of fairly small print. Pictorial symbols were banned and a party name was only supposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  Fife,	  this	  worked	  out	  at	  less	  than	  £0.001	  per	  elector.	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be used with formal permission, which three of the four major parties discouraged. Copies of 
the ballot papers and booklets are reproduced in Appendix Two. Given their limited 
information about the role, voters had to decide for themselves how they would choose. As 
one candidate put it, “although you’ve got all those candidate statements there was actually 
no criteria … it’s like getting a CV with no job description” (Candidate Interview One, Fife).   
 
   Obviously voters could still access adequate information, but this required much more 
effort than usual. They had the option of reading the candidate statements and searching for 
the candidates’ backgrounds in the local press and by word of mouth. Making candidates’ 
contact details available allowed voters to call them, and in fact a few candidates reported 
being interviewed in phone calls by particularly heroic voters who wanted to speak to their 
shortlisted candidates.  
   Most electors, however, had many competing calls on their time and energy. The issue was 
not the inaccessibility of information but its high cost versus the expected utility of choosing 
a candidate who was marginally more promising than the others. As Popkin (1994) 
emphasizes, it is unrealistic to expect most voters to devote much time to research. Instead 
most rely on information they can obtain ‘for free’ as a by-product of everyday life – or else 
in the polling booth. 
    Similarly, a few voters with extreme party allegiances could have found out candidates’ 
allegiances with a lot of research, but most voters would have struggled. Candidates who 
were also members of political parties may have made other party members aware that they 
were standing, but very few mentioned a party affiliation in their statements. The exceptions 
were three Liberal Democrats who mentioned their allegiance (only one was elected, and that 
was probably better explained by his credentials as a surgeon and former leader of the British 
Medical Association) one Green and one Labour member (both elected; the Green member 
placed a particularly eye-catching exhortation to “STOP COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
CLOSURES!” much more prominently then her party allegiance). The names of candidates 
who were also Conservative members were posted on the Conservative Party website in 
Dumfries & Galloway, but only a tiny proportion of the population would have visited that 
website prior to the election.  
    Some other candidates were coincidentally party members, and – for example – a Labour 
member could potentially have casually informed activists she knew personally that she was 
standing. But this would not have been very different from the informal contact with friends 
and acquaintances which most candidates described in interviews. It was very different from 
a formal endorsement. Labour-leaning voters who did not know the candidate personally or 
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by reputation as a Labour activist would not have been aware of this allegiance. They were 
deprived of that information in order to mute the influence of partisan politics in elected 
Boards. Similarly, we saw little evidence that parties were actively campaigning, and if any 
were doing so surreptitiously those campaigns must have been stunningly unsuccessful, given 
how uninformed many voters felt.  
   The restriction on party symbols reflected a taboo against politicisation of the NHS.
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The Party Taboo 
We discussed the elections with a wide range of local people and found widespread 
opposition to political parties playing a role in the NHS. One unaffiliated candidate in Fife 
summed up the concern that possible politicization would impede NHS personnel: 
“I really disagree with there being political parties involved in this… I think if we 
start politicizing health, then decisions are going to be made for the wrong reasons. 
And I’m suspicious, I’ve got friends who are councilors in different areas and they’ll 
be quite happy telling me that they will argue something out, even if they agree with 
it, because it’s the other party that said it” (Candidate Interview Two, Fife) 
    Voters were similarly sceptical:  
“I just don’t feel that party politics should come into anything to do with health. 
Because health is for everybody and some people will have different ideas on health – 
different parties will possibly have different ideas on health … the main issue is to be 
with the health people [clinicians]” (Voter Interview One, Dumfries and Galloway) 
Several open-text responses to our survey of electors spontaneously expressed hostility to 
political parties, for example fearing that an elected Board would be “The same as politics. 
They promise everything but when they get in, nothing”. 
    There is clearly a strong current of public opinion which wants the management of the 
NHS to be as far removed from party politics as feasible. Some were cynical about the kinds 
of people who become involved in partisan politics4. Others foresaw structural problems 
maintaining consensus in a Health Board if some members had partisan agendas. Still others 
believed that decisions affecting life and death should be made by medical professionals – 
who have been shown time and again to enjoy greater public trust than politicians, at least 
when the two groups are presented in the abstract (Ipsos MORI 2011).   
     It may seem odd that partisan politicians would seek to restrict their own parties from 
increasing their own influence over a key public service, and a cynic might imagine that they 
were being disingenuous, perhaps hoping that their loyalists would win election in spite of 
the restrictions. However, our interviews with Party and Government officials (Scottish 
National Party Interview One, Scottish Government Interview One, Scottish Government 
Interview Two) suggest they really wanted to keep partisan competition out of the NHS. 
Influential figures within the main political parties themselves feared that partisan activity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  research	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  2010	  MPs’	  expenses	  scandal,	  which	  saw	  several	  national	  
politicians	  charged	  with	  fraud.	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would either be inappropriate for the NHS or might inflame public opinion. One official in 
the governing Scottish National Party put this particularly clearly:  
“Q: Was there any formal party endorsement of people who were [coincidentally also] 
SNP members who put their names forward? 
A: No 
Q: Why was that? 
A: Because we were quite certain in our view that these were not for political ends. 
Any individual wishing to stand was free to do so but we certainly were not putting up 
a Party ticket… from memory most of the other Parties took that view as well. … 
certainly we had approaches from one or two people seeking to put the name Scottish 
National Party on the ballot paper and they were told we weren’t authorizing any use 
of the SNP name… We did not see this as a political, Big P election… 
I don’t think people would have appreciated it if they’d been told ‘here’s a chance to 
get some actual say in the people sitting on the Health Board’ and suddenly you find 
you’ve got a slate from each party… 
 It may sound odd coming from a political party but, you know, you can’t politicize 
everything.” Scottish National Party Interview One 
   We are inclined to believe that decision-makers genuinely did not intend the elected 
members to be controlled by political parties. Interviewees were fairly consistent, and the 
policy of holding elections to Health Boards was very much driven by the Scottish National 
Party – which prevented anyone from formally running under its banner.  
    Given our snapshot of public opinion, this may have been wise. But removing the parties 
also removed an important heuristic. 
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Parties and costs of voting 
Political parties have succeeded as a form of organization across developed electoral systems, 
even where voters are actually asked to select an individual candidate (as they are in 
constituency-based electoral systems and were in the Health Board elections). One classic 
explanation is their heuristic function: parties help voters decide which candidate to support 
based on limited information (Bartels 1996, Coan et al 2008, Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan and 
Sprague 1999, Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 2006, Lavine and Gschwend 2007, Rahn 1993, Roy 
2009, cf. Cutler 2002). Thinking about voting in cost-benefit terms (Downs 1957 cf. Riker 
and Ordeshook 1968), most of the suggested benefits of voting to the voter come not merely 
from expressing a preference but from making a meaningful, informed choice between 
alternatives. Most of the costs of casting a meaningful vote are actually costs of gathering 
information to distinguish among candidates. It may be slightly puzzling that voters turn out 
given the infinitesimal odds of one vote affecting the outcome, but turnout does seem to some 
extent sensitive to costs (see Blais 2000). Heuristics reduce these costs. Knowing individuals’ 
party affiliations helps voters to compare them, drawing attention to particular cleavages they 
may care about (Franklin 2004, Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For example, a party system 
divided by a religious-secular cleavage should push voters’ attention towards religious issues.  
Voters can make inferences about candidates by knowing which party endorsed them (see 
Rahn 1993). Voters might reasonably infer (or at least might think they can reasonably infer) 
that a candidate endorsed by a left-wing party is more likely to support left-wing policies, 
without needing to study that candidate’s background. 
   This classic analysis may have applied to the Health Board elections too, but parties may 
have fulfilled another heuristic function which has received less attention. Most analyses of 
voter decision-making focus on highly-publicised, high-profile partisan contests in which 
candidates have undergone intense scrutiny before their names appear on the ballot. In a 
contest such as a Health Board election - in which entry barriers were so low – endorsement 
could be an implicit signal of basic competence. Our reasoning is essentially that parties, 
especially major parties contesting many other constituencies across the country, perform a 
screening function. Candidates need to be selected by a party to receive its endorsement. 
Voters may not be aware of how this selection process works, any more than patients in a 
hospital are aware of the intricacies of medical school curricula. But voters can appreciate, 
perhaps subliminally, there would be a cost to the party from nominating an embarrassing 
candidate, just as there would be serious consequences for a medical school which allowed an 
incompetent student to graduate. A local party branch would risk future vote share and 
influence, while the national party could risk a much larger contest. Therefore, voters can 
infer that endorsed candidates are less likely to be a liability to the party and hence to the 
constituency. In the Health Board elections, voters could not usually infer competence by 
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choosing candidates endorsed by someone else, and thus would have no-one else to blame if 
they had contributed to the election of a dangerously incompetent Board member5. 
   Interestingly, heuristic explanations of how parties function do not (necessarily) imply that 
voters are attracted to parties per se. Voters might find party labels extremely useful while 
holding political parties as institutions in contempt.  
   Access to informational shortcuts, like that provided by a party label, should therefore 
increase turnout. In Health Board elections the limited heuristics available, and the difficulty 
of picking relevant information out of 10,000 words of candidates’ statements, greatly 
increased the costs of research. And if, as Blais’ (2000) argument would seem to suggest, a 
sense of moral responsibility often drives turnout, there might well be a potential 
psychological cost to consider. The lack of quality-control usually offered by parties could 
leave voters bearing the cognitive costs of knowing that they had chosen, based on a 250-
word statement, a candidate who turned out to be a disaster.    
    Thus, the Health Board elections removed a key heuristic. An elector who is not presented 
with an easy source of information such as a party label can   
• seek more information about that candidate as an individual 
• simply not vote, or  
• seek other heuristics  
    The first of these options is costly.  
    Low turnout in these elections suggests that the second option was widespread.  
    The third option, heuristic-seeking, is also very possible. Voters may be attracted to a wide 
variety of heuristics. Voters who cannot access ‘good’ heuristics often resort to bad ones. 
Johns and Shephard (2011) show that candidates’ physical appearance is more likely to 
influence poorly-informed voters presented with photographs on a ballot paper. Conroy-
Krutz (2012) demonstrates that Ugandan voters use candidates’ ethnicity to make their 
decision when they lack information about the candidates’ other attributes, but giving more 
information reduces the salience of ethnicity. And it is no coincidence that VO Key (1949) 
found particularly widespread “friends-and-neighbors” voting in the Southern United States 
during its period of Democratic hegemony. In the absence of meaningful party competition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  members	  who	  were	  elected	  did	  not	  fit	  this	  description	  –	  but	  voters	  could	  not	  have	  known	  this	  in	  
advance.	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personal familiarity as well as civic pride may prove important - although such localism does 
have (weaker) effect in partisan elections too (Bowler, Donovan and Snipp 1993, Rice and 
Macht 1987: 452, Tatalovich 1975).  
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Electors’ reactions 
Our results suggest that electors did respond to the Health Board elections as the theory 
would predict. 
    Firstly, official turnout records confirmed that turnout was low, particularly compared with 
the General Election a few weeks earlier. But of course those records alone gave us limited 
information to explain why.  
   Responses to our survey gave us more clues. We mailed survey forms, reproduced in 
Appendix One, to 3000 names on the Fife electoral register and another 3000 in Dumfries & 
Galloway. Of those, 35% responded (excluding voters who had moved and whose forms 
were returned undelivered). Response to our survey skewed slightly towards both older 
electors and those who had voted, but given our access to the official turnout records we were 
able to correct this by applying appropriate weightings to the figures (Author citation 2012). 
   We used logistic regressions to find out what kinds of electors were more likely to turn out: 
this kind of analysis was, of course, restricted to items included on the survey forms 
(Appendix One). We fitted two simple logistic models and one hierarchical logistic 
regression (Table One). The third regression included voters’ self-reports of how well-
informed they felt about the election. This required a hierarchical model because information 
is not independent of the other variables but seems likely to act as an intervening variable. 
The first two models tested whether demographics affected odds of voting, while the third 
treated demographics as predictors of information which in turn predicted odds of voting. 
Independent 
variables 
(*=categorical 
code) 
Model One Model Two Model Three Block 
One 
Block Two 
 B S.E. p B S.E. p B S.E. p B S.E. p 
Age .022 .004 <.001 .022 .004 <.001 .022 .004 <.001 .022 .004 <.001 
Health*   .93   .89   .94   .906 
Sex*   .31   .30   .25   .28 
Declared 
disability* 
  .59   .57   .58   .32 
Ethnicity*   .29   .28   .47   .44 
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Education*   .19   .22   .21   .09 
Postcode area*   .501          
Scottish Index 
of Multiple 
Deprivation 
rank of postcode 
  .21   .25   .33   .41 
Health Board 
(DG or Fife) 
   .25 .109 .003       
Information 
about election* 
(reference 
category: 
Very well 
informed) 
           <.001 
Well 
Informed 
           .28 
Not very 
well 
informed 
         1.38 .18 <.001 
Not very 
well 
informed 
         1.29 .18 <.001 
Constant -
0.83 
1.3 0.53 -
1.18 
1.3 .37 -.90 1.3 .49 -2.07 1.3 .12 
N (missing 
cases deleted 
listwise) 
1712 1712 1671  
Nagelkerke R2 .066 .073 .068 .15 
Table One: Logistic regression predicting turnout, forced entry (1 = voted, 0 = abstained) 
   The first two models show that most of the demographic characteristics which usually 
predict turnout were not good predictors for the Health Board election. Perhaps surprisingly, 
where an elector’s postcode fell on the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation - the closest 
we had to a measure of socio-economic status - was not a significant predictor. Neither were 
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health, sex, ethnicity, level of education, or which postcode area (e.g. KY2) the elector lived 
in6.  
    Age was strongly correlated with turnout in all models, with each additional year 
increasing an elector’s odds of voting by more than 2%. There are several possible 
interpretations for this, such as older voters having more time to research, feeling a greater 
sense of duty to the NHS, or being more likely to know candidates – who also tended to be 
older – personally. We do not have enough information to generalise. 
    Electors living in Dumfries & Galloway were significantly more likely to vote than those 
in Fife. Again, there were several possible explanations. Dumfries & Galloway had a much 
greater density of candidates and a proposed hospital reorganization had attracted significant 
attention in the local press; the largely rural area also has a history of higher turnout than Fife 
in conventional elections.  
    The hierarchical regression added a measure of how well-informed electors felt. We would 
expect that demographics would have some causal effect on feelings of being informed as 
well as on turnout, so the demographics were added as a separate block in the analysis. This 
hierarchical model showed that (self-rated) level of information was strongly correlated with 
probability of voting (Table One) even when we controlled for all the demographic 
difference. Including self-rated information more than doubled the R2 score to .15, meaning 
that our model corresponded with the observations much more closely when information was 
included.   
    Our survey forms also included a small box (see Appendix One) in which electors were 
asked “Why did you decide to vote or not to vote in the Health Board election?”. Coding 
these responses7 revealed that 254 of 481 respondents who reported8 they had not voted 
(53%) wrote in responses which reflected their feeling uninformed about either the election 
or the candidates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  survey	  data.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  official	  turnout	  records	  for	  the	  whole	  population	  showed	  
that	  certain	  postcode	  areas	  in	  Dumfries	  &	  Galloway	  containing	  closure-­‐threatened	  hospitals	  did	  have	  higher	  
turnout.	  See	  (Author	  Citation	  2013).	  
7	  Two	  independent	  coders	  agreed	  on103	  of	  a	  random	  sample	  of	  113	  of	  these	  codes,	  giving	  a	  Cohen’s	  Kappa	  of	  
.867	  (p<0.001).We	  used	  18	  coding	  categories	  in	  total,	  and	  only	  two	  of	  the	  disagreements	  were	  on	  responses	  
one	  coder	  categorised	  as	  lack	  of	  information.	  
8	  Respondents	  were	  given	  the	  option	  of	  declaring	  that	  they	  were	  ‘unsure’	  if	  they	  had	  voted,	  as	  well	  as	  
answering	  ‘yes’	  or	  ‘no’.	  Not	  all	  voters	  answered	  this	  question	  and	  not	  all	  wrote	  in	  a	  response,	  which	  is	  why	  
only	  487	  respondents	  are	  included	  here.	  The	  other	  elements	  of	  survey	  analysis	  are	  based	  on	  official	  records	  
rather	  than	  self-­‐reported	  turnout.	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Lack of information 254 (53%) 
Protest 56 (12%) 
Did not expect vote to have desired effect 33 (7%) 
Ineligible or away 30 (6%) 
Not interested 25 (5%) 
All other categories under 5% of total 83 (17%) 
Table Two: Handwritten explanations for not voting 
    The most plausible interpretation of the data is that lack of information discouraged 
turnout. We conducted in-depth interviews with 20 electors and the evidence from the 
interviews further supports our interpretation. Furthermore, our interviews suggested that 
even voters who did turn out were influenced by the difficulty of learning about the 
candidates. 
Interviews: information was the key factor 
We interviewed 20 eligible voters, drawn from the respondents to our survey to ensure wide 
geographic coverage. We also interviewed more than half of the 130 candidates for election 
and asked about their feedback from electors. Over and over again, our interviewees stressed 
the problem of voters’ information about the candidates, reinforcing our inferences about 
causality from the survey results. They emphasized variously  
1) Voters being uninformed about what health board members actually do, and therefore 
about the skills necessary for the role:  
“with elections for national government and the Scottish Government and for local 
government I suppose because they happen more often, you know what sort of role 
the elected people will have and what sort of decisions they’d be making, but I didn’t 
know much about how the Health Board worked and what the elected members were 
supposed to be doing. I was very surprised that there was no information provided 
about that so you were basically asked to choose names at random with no notice of 
what the positions were” Non-voter Interview One, Fife 
2) Finding the information about the candidates provided overwhelming: 
 “I think the fact that there’s 70 candidates is horrendous, I think it’s far too many. 
Obviously they can’t put a limit on it but the amount of material – this has been an 
issue for a lot of people that I have actually spoken to. They know the couple of 
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candidates locally that are standing, but the time it takes them to trawl through and 
read all 70 – I don’t know how many people will actually sit down and read all 70 
candidate statements, to be honest.” Candidate Interview One, Dumfries & Galloway 
3) Electors who did read the candidate statements (roughly 10,000 words) finding much 
of the information was rather unhelpful for assessing candidates’ future performance:  
“when I was presented with the voting information … it is actually very difficult to 
make any kind of rational decision on the basis of 250 words of self-congratulatory 
hype” Voter Interview Three, Dumfries and Galloway. 
     Many of the candidates had not sought elected office before, and had little 
experience of making a pitch in 250 words. 
 
    Consequently, we found at least some voters were tempted to improvise. 
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Heuristics without parties 
While turnout was both low and skewed, many thousands of votes were cast in this election. 
Even reading the candidate statements represented a considerable investment of time; reading 
them, remembering all the information, and using it to rank candidates in order of preference 
was a considerable mental exercise9. It would not be surprising if many voters inferred what 
they could from the information they could access easily (or simply preferred not to vote). 
Statistics give us limited information about how electors made their decisions, but our 
interviews give us a sense of the kinds of heuristics they were using.  
    While the Non-Executive role has traditionally been filled mainly by non-clinicians, some 
electors clearly sought clinical professionals. Medical qualifications might be considered an 
easily-detectable proxy for competence (McDermott 2005), which, as noted, was more of an 
issue here than in a partisan election. Although only one candidate had ‘Dr’ printed in front 
of his name on the ballot (he was elected), it was relatively easy to locate the words ‘Doctor’ 
and ‘G.P.’ from a skim of the candidate statements. All candidates with those words were 
elected. Similarly, skimming candidate statements for the word ‘nurse’ was relatively quick.  
“The hospital I was in last was definitely not clean … so I thought perhaps that nurses 
– who used to be nurses – could have seen the difference and perhaps they could say 
something at the [Board] meetings” Voter Interview One 
    More of the voters we spoke with emphasized that they had chosen local candidates, 
sometimes candidates they knew personally or recognized from another prominent position 
(consistent with Streb, Frederick and LaFrance 2009: 650-1) but often based on their 
postcodes (which were printed on the ballot). This should not be terribly surprising. ‘Friends 
and neighbours’ voting is typically most pronounced when identifying differences between 
the candidates’ platforms becomes difficult (Key 1949: 110).  
    Voters who admitted a strong preference for locals often suggested that having a local on 
the Board would ensure fair treatment for their area. In Dumfries & Galloway, where the 
major political issues in local health services was the Board’s plan to close small local 
hospitals and centralize services in a few larger units, using postcodes was rationalized in 
terms of information flow. Health Board officials in the (relatively large) town of Dumfries, 
where the region’s main hospital is based, were seen as being ignorant of the challenges of 
being ill in rural areas. Having a local representative was seen as a means of ensuring that the 
unique challenges of a particular area were not forgotten. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  9(Author	  One)	  observed	  the	  count	  in	  Fife,	  and	  was	  struck	  by	  one	  ballot	  on	  which	  the	  (anonymous)	  voter	  had	  
faithfully	  ranked	  the	  candidates	  from	  1	  to	  60.	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“Q: There were a lot of names in there, did you get a chance to read all the way 
through or – 
A: Yes, yes. 
Q: In much detail or – 
A: I just read where they lived and what they did 
Q: Why were you interested in where they lived? 
A: Well, the area. I’d like them to be from this area… it’s a big area …” Voter 
Interview One, Dumfries & Galloway 
    Candidates who had been campaigning widely seemed to believe this was common: 
“There is massive evidence from all the people I’ve spoken to that all the votes are 
going locally” Candidate Interview Three, Fife 
    While the Board’s formal code of governance precluded members from lobbying on behalf 
of their local areas, voters were not made aware of this at the time. In the event, some elected 
members of the Health Board in Dumfries & Galloway who happened to come from rural 
areas really did voice concerns at this policy once they arrived at the Board table (Greer et al 
2014). 
    Almost all our interviewees reported having voted for at least one candidate who was a 
personal acquaintance or friend of a friend10. Almost all voters and candidates emphasized 
that people were much more likely to vote for candidates who they knew personally – even if 
they had no idea about their acquaintance’s views on healthcare: 
    “[…] if I hadn’t known [candidates], I would never … it was only talking to them 
that I had any kind of understanding of it. It’s not something really that you can vote 
on, you don’t have any depth of understanding about the person that you’re reading 
about… Unless you know them personally… there’s not a lot that I could have went 
on. You’ve got to really know the person before you can judge them... 
Q: How much do you know about the Health Board?  
A: Not a great deal, it’s something that I know exists, apart from that it isn’t of great 
interest to me” Voter Interview Two, Dumfries and Galloway 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Or	  for	  a	  candidate	  they	  thought	  they	  knew	  –	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  few	  cases	  of	  mistaken	  identity.	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    In our interviews with the candidates, there was support for some of these hypotheses. 
Clinicians typically believed the electorate sought clinicians, most thought their neighbours 
were likely to have voted for them, and almost all expected friends and acquaintances to have 
voted for them, often emphasizing how many people they knew socially (multiple 
interviewees described themselves as “a weel-kent11 face” in the local area).  
    Almost all our direct evidence that voters were seeking alternative heuristics comes from 
interviews, although some open-text survey responses spontaneously mentioned a desire for 
locals or medical professionals. Unlike the survey responses, those interviews do not give us 
a basis for quantifying how many voters relied on these alternative heuristics. They were 
certainly common among our twenty interviewees. But we also interviewed half of the 
candidates and a range of NHS officials. Many of them reported being told similar stories. 
While hearsay evidence is not ideal, we do think that in combination all of this makes it safe 
to say that a significant proportion of voters would have been guided by credentials, 
occupations or geography, even if we are not able to specify frequencies. These were not as 
easy to identify as a prominent party logo, but they were still relatively accessible to voters 
reading the ballot and perhaps quickly skimming candidate statements. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Well-­‐known	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Normative questions 
This evidence raises normative questions about the function of heuristics in elections. 
    Heuristics are by definition imperfect compared to learning about candidates in depth 
(Bartels 1996). However, heuristic devices clearly benefit voters by allowing them to make 
passably reasonable decisions at minimal cost, and there seems to be a case that they 
encourage turnout. The literature has tended to treat the party heuristic in particular as 
relatively benign (Coan et al 2008). According to this logic, providing voters with relatively 
sensible heuristics, such as a party label, might be better than forcing them to make a choice 
between a flawed heuristic and a very costly examination of each candidate’s record. 
    Choosing a candidate because he or she lived nearby, or was a nodding acquaintance, or 
was a doctor, does not necessarily mean that the voters decided poorly. In fact, there may be 
very good reason to favour a local candidate (Childs and Cowley 2011) or a GP. Some voters 
perceived the role of an elected member to be, variously, furthering their local area’s interests 
versus other parts of the Health Board’s territory and relaying information about local needs 
to the centre. The first of these would violate the Boards’ own internal codes of conduct, 
which oblige members to act in the best interests of the region as a whole, and our research 
on Board operations revealed a strong social taboo against lobbying on behalf of specific 
areas among established members (Greer et al 2014). However, voters were not made aware 
of this, and would have been much more familiar with elected representatives such as MPs 
and local councilors for whom lobbying on behalf of constituents is an important part of the 
job. Similarly, while Non-Executive Directors are supposed to provide a lay person’s 
perspective, and Boards are expected to provide reports to their members which can be 
interpreted without specialist knowledge, electors were not generally informed about this and 
had legitimate reason to worry that lay members would not understand or could easily be 
bamboozled by experts reporting to the Board.  
    Sociodemographic information may function as a shortcut for policy information, but it is 
possible that voters are actively seeking other qualities which they believe are captured by 
simple information about candidates’ backgrounds. While McDermott (2005) shows that, in 
the absence of better information, voters will try to infer candidates’ competence from their 
occupations, Cutler (2002) interprets the relationship rather differently. He argues that voters 
are attracted to candidates from similar social backgrounds to their own, even when they have 
the requisite policy information. These positions need not be mutually exclusive – voters 
might, for example, be making inferences about how a candidate from a similar social 
background would react to unknown situations. 
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   This does, however, raise the question of whether the availability of one heuristic rather 
than another distorts voters’ decision-making process. Both arguments seem to imply that 
which cues are made readily-accessible will be a major factor affecting the outcome of an 
election – perhaps more important than candidates’ actual characteristics. 
    A similar argument could of course be made about party labels. Dividing a diverse 
population of candidates for public office into a finite number of parties emphasizes certain 
cleavages. This is likely to influence voters’ decisions. For example, if the major division in a 
party system is between high taxes and low spending, a voter for whom the legality of 
abortion is the most important issue and taxation only a minor one will find it difficult to 
decide on this basis. The voter will need to conduct extensive research prior to the election in 
order to find out which candidate shares his or her position on abortion. At some point the 
lower cost of choosing a candidate who shares his or her position on taxation, even if this is a 
tertiary issue, will affect the decision. 
    The most accessible fact about Health Board candidates was their home address, printed on 
the ballots. Did the decision to print candidates’ postcodes on the ballot affect the outcome of 
the election? Given the narrow margins of victory, it seems quite likely that this could have 
influenced the results, even if only a few voters were influenced. But it may be difficult or 
impossible to avoid shaping in this way somehow. The psychological literature (see Chaiken 
and Trope 1999 for a review) shows us that heuristic-seeking is ubiquitous. We may feel that 
voters should choose a more sensible heuristic than postcode, but what would be the better 
heuristic is a difficult normative (and inherently political) question in itself. It is possible that 
at that moment postcode-driven voters genuinely thought a local candidate would have 
superior access to information about their lives and would represent them best. This is 
certainly part of the rationale for electing local representatives to Councils and Parliament.  
    But voters might also have chosen local candidates because information on the candidate’s 
address was easily available and information on policies was difficult to obtain, and only 
subsequently rationalized this behavior in terms of representation. Quite probably both 
processes occurred at the same time; the distinction is rarely clear-cut (Chaiken and Trope 
1999). 
     If a fair proportion of the voters in elections seek simple heuristics, and it is at least 
possible that they frame voters’ choices, then it makes sense to structure those heuristics in 
such a way as to avoid artificially incentivizing them to rely on information of limited value. 
What gets printed in a voting pack is itself political. 
‘Turnout,	  information	  and	  heuristics	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Health	  Board	  elections:	  “getting	  a	  CV	  with	  no	  job	  
description”’	  
Draft	  version	  of	  an	  article	  forthcoming	  in	  Political	  Studies,	  2014.	  	  
Authors:	  Iain	  Wilson,	  Scott	  L.	  Greer,	  Ellen	  Stewart	  and	  Peter	  D.	  Donnelly.	  
	  
23	  
	  
   The decision to put candidates’ addresses on the ballot, however, does not seem to have 
been a conscious attempt to get voters to think of elected members as champions of particular 
areas of the Health Board territories. The codes of conduct for non-executives, including 
elected members, strongly emphasized that they should make corporate decisions in the 
interest of the region as a whole (NHS Fife 2010: 8-11, 15-6, Greer et al 2014). Rather, the 
electoral rules under which these contests were held had been copied from elections to much 
smaller national parks, in which it was plausible that most voters would know candidates 
personally and printing their address would help people know if they were voting for, for 
example, John Macrae of 1 Election Street or John Macrae of 1 Heuristic Avenue (Scottish 
Government Interview One). Only in a context of a largely under-informed electorate did this 
take on greater significance.   
   There is a risk that voters might infer legislative intent from the heuristics made available. 
The public were being asked to elect Non-Executive Directors to the Health Board, but the 
role of a Non-Executive in the NHS is poorly understood. Even within the system, the role 
seems to be somewhat fluid, with different interviewees expressing different opinions on 
what non-executives were for (Author Citation 2012). One point about which system insiders 
agreed, however – be they civil servants, politicians or senior NHS personnel and existing 
Board members – was that non-executives should not be championing their local areas at the 
expense of other parts of the Board territory. Given what we know about the voters’ likely 
decision-making processes, making the postcode heuristic readily available seemed to 
conflict with this. 
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Conclusion 
The low turnout in the pilot elections provoked media criticism and contributed to the 
Scottish Government decision not to pursue elections across Scotland (BBC 2013, Greer et al 
2014). But there is a familiar paradox here. While there is a widespread desire to insulate the 
NHS from party politics, in conventional elections many voters rely on party politics for most 
of the information they use to distinguish between candidates. There is a substantial literature 
which explores the importance of information in turnout decisions, and which implies that 
trying to reduce the role of political parties in the elections may undermine participation - 
even while potential participants abhor politicisation. 
    Electors in both Fife and Dumfries & Galloway were poorly-informed about these 
elections, and this was a very important factor in the low turnout. Low turnout was doubly 
unfortunate because turnout was skewed towards older voters. Given the unexpectedly high 
numbers of candidates, allowing each a 250-word statement overloaded most electors with 
reading. In this sense, the elections were a victim of their own unexpected success in 
attracting candidates. However, even if there had been only enough candidates for the 
elections to be contested the volume of text would still have been significant, and some voters 
who read the whole leaflet still found the information insufficient or untrustworthy. 
    At least some, probably many, of the voters sought out heuristics which enabled them to 
choose a candidate without processing a large body of written material. When deprived of 
party labels, they resorted to postcodes, doctorates and nodding acquaintances. 
    This points to a difficult normative question. Voters’ choices of heuristic were hardly 
indefensible. While they might have gained more by reading all the candidates’ statements, 
several of our interviewees were able to rationalize their decision not to do so quite 
convincingly, on the basis that they gathered much of the information they wanted from the 
heuristic. Others argued that the 250-word extracts were simply not useful information, 
distorted by self-promotion.  
    In this context we cannot easily distinguish post-hoc rationalizations from reasoned 
decision-making. But voters’ judgments about what was important could have been driven by 
the ready availability of a heuristic. This could, of course, be said of party labels in 
conventional elections as well. Voters who were driven to research the candidates’ 
backgrounds, or at least to read the candidate statements, might have gathered more reliable 
information than a party logo would have provided (assuming, perhaps optimistically, that the 
250 words were well-chosen). But given the high opportunity costs of actually reading the 
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statements it seems likely that many responded by substituting another heuristic, possibly a 
less useful one, or by not voting at all. 
    Given public hostility to political parties becoming involved, particularly in the NHS, voter 
information will remain problematic if direct elections to public bodies are to be instituted 
elsewhere. If our interviews with voters and candidates in this election are any guide, there is 
a serious tension between public dislikes. Interviewees simultaneously decried the low 
turnout in the elections, the potential politicization of the NHS, and the difficulty of deciding 
who to vote for in these elections compared to conventional, partisan contests. 
    One obvious finding seems fairly secure: when faced with 10,000 words they are 
apparently expected to read and reflect on before casting their votes, few voters will actually 
do so. 
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